Abstract. This paper presents two key-recovery attacks against the last modication to Achterbahn-128/80 proposed by the authors at SASC 2007 due to the previous attacks. The 80-bit variant, Achterbahn-80, has been limited to produce at most 2 52 bits of keystream with the same pair of key and IV, while Achterbahn-128 is limited to 2 56 . The attack against Achterbahn-80 has complexity 2 67 and needs fewer than 2 52 bits of keystream, and the one against Achterbahn-128 has complexity 2 104 and needs fewer than 2 56 keystream bits. These attacks are based on the previous ones. The attack against Achterbahn-80 uses a new idea which provides a trade-o between the keystream length and the computational complexity when decimating.
Introduction
Achterbahn [2, 4] is a stream cipher proposal submitted to the eSTREAM project. After the cryptanalysis of the rst two versions [8, 7] , it has moved on to a new one called Achterbahn-128/80 [3] published in June 2006. Achterbahn-128/80 corresponds to two keystream generators with key sizes of 128 bits and 80 bits, respectively. Their maximal keystream length was limited to 2 63 . As this version has been attacked [6, 9] , the authors have proposed a new limitation of the keystream length [5] , which is 2 52 for Achterbahn-80 and 2 56 for Achterbahn-128. We present here two attacks against both generators, which are based on the previous ones. The attack against the 80-bit variant, Achterbahn-80, has complexity 2 67 and needs fewer than 2 52 keystream bits. The attack against Achterbahn-128 requires 2 104 operations and fewer than 2 56 keystream bits.
Distinguishing attack against Achterbahn-80
Now, we describe a new attack against Achterbahn-80 with a complexity of 2
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where a linear approximation of the output function is considered. The attack is a distinguishing attack but it also allows to recover the initial states of certain constituent registers.
This attack is very similar to the previous attack against Achterbahn-80. Our attack exploits the following linear approximation of the combining function G:
Since G is 6-resilient, is the best approximation by a 7-variable function.
For
Parity-checks. Let us build a parity-check as follows:
The terms containing the sequences x 3 , x 4 , x 5 , x 7 vanish in (t), so (t) depends exclusively on the sequences x 1 , x 6 and x 10 . The period T 4 T 5 is 2 51 and the period T 3 T 7 is smaller than 2 49 as T 3 and T 7 have common factors, so to build those parity checks we need less than the maximal keystream length allowed.
Adding four times the approximation has the eect of multiplying the bias four times, so the bias of
where (S(t)) t≥0 is the keystream, is 2 −4×3 . We now decimate σ(t) by the period of the register 1, which is involved in the parity-check, so we create like this a new parity-check:
Then, if we did as in the previous attack and we performed an exhaustive search for the initial states of registers 6 and 10, we would need
30.29 parity-checks σ (t) to detect this bias. As we are decimating by the period of the register 1, we would need 2 30.29 × 2 22 = 2 52.29 keystream bits to perform the attack, and it is over the limitation, so we cannot do that.
What we are going to do, instead of taking only the rst bit of the keystream and of decimating by the period of the rst register 2 30.29 times, consists in considering the rst four consecutive shifts of the keystream and for each one, we are going to obtain a sequence of 
28.29 . This way, the number of keystream bits that we need is reduced to 2 28.29 × 2 22 = 2 50.29 and respects the maximal keystream length permitted. This is going to change time complexity as now we will have to perform an exhaustive search on the four following bits generated by register 1:
for i ∈ {0, . . . , 3}. As we do not care about the real value of those bits but of the dierences (z i + z 0 )∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we are going to evaluate the 2 3 possible states only. Thus, we perform an exhaustive search over the registers 6 and 10, adapting to our new situation the algorithm introduced in [9] . We will have to compute, for each one of the previously mentioned sequences, so for each i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, the following sum:
where σ(t), σ 6 (t) and σ 10 (t) are the parity checks computed at the instant t with the keystream, the sequence generated by the register 6 and the one generated by the register 10 respectively, and where We choose an initial state for register 6, e.g. the all-one initial state. We compute and save a binary vector V 6 of length T 6 :
where the sequence with whom we are computing σ 6 (k) is generated from the chosen initial state. The complexity of this state is T 6 × 2 2 operations.
For each possible initial state of register 10 (so 2 31−1 possibilities): • we compute and save four vectors V 10,i , where i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, each one composed of T 6 integers of 2 bits.
where m = 2 if k ≤ T and m = 1 if k > T . The complexity of this state is:
for each possible initial state of register 10, where 2 2 is the number of vectors that we are computing, 2 3 corresponds to the number of operations required for computing each (σ(t) + σ 10 (t)) and 2 28.29 × 2 is the cost of summing up 2 28.29 integers of 2 bits.
• For each possible p from 0 to T 6 − 1:
* we dene V 6,i of length T 6 , ∀i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}:
Actually, (V 6,i [k]) k<T 6 corresponds to (σ 6 (k)) k<T 6 when the initial state of register 6 corresponds to the internal state obtained after clocking (i + p) times register 6 from the all-one initial state. * With the eight vectors that we have obtained (V 10,0 , . . . , V 10,3 , V 6,0 , . . . , V 6,3 ), we compute for each i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}:
Now, we do the sum of the four of them, so for all the 2 3 possible states of the bits z 0 , . . . , z 3 coming from register 1, and considering z 0 as positive:
When we do this with the correct initial states of registers 6 and 10, we will nd the expected bias at one of the 2 3 possible sums. The complexity of this point would be, for each p:
62 . But we can speed up the process: We dene two new vectors,
With those two vectors we are going to compute:
The issue is now to nd the p that maximizes this sum, this is the same as computing the maximum of the crosscorrelation of two sequences of length 4T 6 . We can do that eciently using a fast Fourier transform as explained in [1, pages 306-312]. The nal complexity for computing this sum will be in 4T 6 log 2 (4T 6 ). We have not nished yet, as we have to do this for each one of the possible relative states of the z i , and we can do that by recomputing V 6 [k ], which will have a low complexity as all we have to do is to xor the bits of the states corresponding to the i = j when z i = z 0 . Thus, the total complexity of this state will be 2 3 × 4T 6 log 2 (4T 6 ) ≈ 2
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The time complexity is going to be, nally: 
Distinguishing attack against Achterbahn-128
Now, we present a distinguishing attack against the 128-bit version of Achterbahn which also recovers the initial states of two registers. We consider the following approximation of the combining function F : (x 0 , . . . , x 12 ) = x 0 + x 1 + x 2 + x 3 + x 4 + x 7 + x 8 + x 9 + x 10 .
Then, for (t) = x 0 (t)+x 1 (t)+x 2 (t)+x 3 (t)+x 4 (t)+x 7 (t)+x 8 (t)+x 9 (t)+x 10 (t), we have Pr[S(t) = (t)] =
